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ABSTRACT:  The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to 
interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the 
amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority 
cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that 
cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of 
reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, 
which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget 
constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, 
as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved.   
 
MAIN RESULT: The essential condition for cooperation is the existence of a reciprocity 
linkage between regions. More precisely, the amount of misreported tax revenues that one 
regional tax administration transmits to another positively depends on the misreported tax 
revenues received from the latter in the previous period. This reciprocity is significantly 
reduced by the existence of budget constraints due to expected deficit. Finally, the presence of 
sluggishness in this process indicates that short-sighted, uncooperative behaviour, driven by 
administrative, financial and transaction costs as well as by budget constraints, is replaced in 
the medium-long run by a more farsighted behaviour that leads to cooperation. 
 
 
JEL Codes:    H71, H77, H83 
Keywords:   Tax information sharing, reciprocity, fiscal federalism 
 
 
José María Durán-Cabré 
Universitat de Barcelona & 
IEB 
Avda. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona (Spain) 
E-mail: jmduran@ub.edu 
Alejandro Esteller-Moré 
Universitat de Barcelona & 
IEB 
Avda. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona (Spain) 
E-mail: aesteller@ub.edu 
Luca Salvadori 
Universitat de Barcelona & 
IEB, TARC 
Avda. Diagonal 690 
08034 Barcelona (Spain) 
E-mail: luca.salvadori@hotmail.it 
 
                                                 
* ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. We would like to thank participants at the ZEW 2014 Public Finance Conference, at the “XXI 
Encuentro de Economía Pública” (University of Girona), at the ERSA 2013 congress, at the ERSA 2012 Summer School, 
at the SIEP 2012 conference, and at the PhD seminars of the IEB, CREIP (University of Tarragona) and Max Planck 
Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance (Munich) for their helpful comments. We are also very grateful to Nadja 
Dwenger, Salmai Qari, Federico Revelli and Lionel Védrine for their useful suggestions. The funding from the Generalitat 
de Catalunya (2009SGR102) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (ECO2012-37873) are gratefully 
acknowledged. Usual disclaimers apply.  
1.  Introduction 
Tax administration policies are crucial in determining the final amount of revenues collected by tax 
authorities. Furthermore, be it in a federal context with decentralized tax administrations, or internationally 
with different national administrations, tax authorities are dependent on each other to enforce tax rules. 
Given these circumstances, investigating the determinants of such policies has become a key issue; yet, the 
literature on horizontal tax interdependencies pays limited attention to these matters. 
 
We seek to investigate the potential for cooperation between sub-central tax authorities by carrying out an 
empirical analysis in a federal context. This represents something of a novelty in the literature and should 
serve to shed some light on alternative designs (centralized vs. decentralized) for tax administration within 
this context. In doing so, we analyse the determinants of information sharing between regional 
administrations based on the Spanish case, which is a good field for empirical research. Spanish regions (the 
so-called “Comunidades Autónomas”, henceforth CAs) have had the power to administer several wealth 
taxes1 since the mid-eighties and following reforms in 1997 and 2002 have also acquired the legislative 
power to modify significant statutory tax parameters2. Thus, this case study should serve as a benchmark for 
evaluating the information-sharing process in a decentralized framework and, more generally, for analysing 
the efficiency of a decentralized tax administration scheme. 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on a specific area of potential cooperation between the CAs, for which 
official data are available. In the case of wealth taxation, legal tax allocation principles (in Spanish, the so-
called “puntos de conexión”) indicate how tax revenues should be distributed among the CAs: the residence 
principle and the territorial (or source) principle, depending on the taxable event3. However, taxpayers are 
not necessarily aware of these and so might commit errors when reporting their tax returns, that is, a taxpayer 
                                                            
1 Namely the inheritance and gift tax (IGT), the annual wealth tax (AWT) and the tax on wealth transfers (TWT).  
 
2 For more details on these reforms, see Esteller-Moré (2008). 
 
3 In the case of the IGT, three different circumstances may occur. The residence principle applies to all inheritances: the 
tax revenues are collected in the CA of residence of the deceased. This principle also applies for gifts of chattels but the 
relevant residence in this case is that of the donor. Finally, in the case of the gift of real estate, the territorial principle 
applies. The AWT is based on the residence principle while the TWT is mainly based on the territorial principle. 
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might pay the tax to the wrong CA4. Thus, each CA should share their information on misreported taxes and 
transfer the corresponding revenue to the competent CA. This is supposedly an automatic practice, but in 
reality it does not always occur this way. Indeed, there is considerable casual evidence confirming that the 
information sharing process between CAs is far from automatic5. This situation might arise because every 
CA faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, cooperating by transmitting the information and the 
misreported tax revenues to other CAs, and, on the other, not cooperating and retaining the misreported tax 
revenues. The costs of cooperation are mainly administrative (being related directly to this information-
sharing process) and financial (a loss of revenue yields). The benefits of cooperation are based on 
reciprocity: if a CA cooperates, it might foster other regions’ cooperation in the future. For this reason, if a 
CA does not cooperate, there may be a cost, as the other CAs will opt not to exchange information in the 
future. In a repeated game, cooperative behaviour should produce mutual benefits for both CAs, since the 
benefits due to reciprocity should be higher than the administrative and financial costs in the short-run. 
Therefore, our main hypothesis is that a CA’s cooperative behaviour is a matter of reciprocity, as it depends 
strictly on the potential cooperation of the other CAs in previous periods.  
 
To test this hypothesis we estimate a Tobit random-effect model and also a dynamic version of this model to 
account for sluggish adjustment in transmitted tax revenues. Our results confirm the role played by 
reciprocity and indicate the presence of persistency in the strategic behaviour of the tax administration. In 
addition, in keeping with the short-run financial benefits of non-cooperation, we find that the impact of 
                                                            
4 Suppose, for example, that a company with its headquarters in Madrid sells a block of flats located in the CA of 
Andalusia and pays the TWT to the CA of Madrid. In this case an error has been incurred as the TWT is subject to the 
territorial principle and the tax return should be reported to the CA of Andalusia. Similarly, there is a mistake when a 
daughter living in the CA of Valencia receives an inheritance from her father, whose residence was in the CA of 
Catalonia, and she reports the IGT to the region in which she lives, rather than to Catalonia as she should have 
according to the allocation principle. 
 
5 Every year tax inspectors from the State review the way in which each region administers its ceded taxes and they 
report their findings in the “Informe sobre la cesión de tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”. For instance, in the 
2006 report about Catalonia, inspectors from the State explain: “It should be noted that existing experiences show an 
unequal behaviour of the different CAs in their degree of compliance with the obligation to submit the information and 
the income due to the competent CA. The perception that the competent services of the Directorate General of Taxes of 
the Catalan government have on this issue is that certain CAs systematically and, in many cases, violate that 
obligation.” (p. 39 of the report). Moreover, from informal conversations maintained with former directors of the 
Catalan tax authority we know that in some cases they chose not to transmit information to other CAs until the latter 
opted to do the same with their misreported taxes. This seems to suggest that ‘reciprocity’ might play a relevant role in 
determining the extent to which information is shared between CAs. Indeed, in the 2002 report about another CA, 
Castille y León, the inspectors from the State explain that this region would not return revenue due to the CA of Madrid 
until the latter transferred revenues due to it. 
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reciprocity is lower when the CAs face budget constraints picked up by the deficit. Thus, according to our 
analysis, in the medium-long run the regional administrations learn the advantages of cooperation thus 
providing elements that support the correct functioning of a decentralized tax administration. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a summary of the relevant literature, in 
section 3 we present our empirical strategy, section 4 presents the results, and we conclude in section 4. 
 
2. Literature review 
The literature has identified two main sources of interdependence at a tax administration level. On the one 
hand, Cremer & Gahvari (2000), examining the implications of tax evasion for fiscal competition and tax 
harmonization policies in an economic union, demonstrate the possibility of mobility-based competition in 
tax enforcement policies. They obtain sub-optimal equilibrium values for both tax and audit rates and show 
that tax harmonization alone is not sufficient to avoid strategic incentives to attract tax bases as there can be 
no commitment to audit policies. Durán-Cabré et al. (2014) have tested this result for the Spanish 
decentralized framework and corroborate the presence of mobility-based competition in tax enforcement 
among regional administrations.  
 
On the other hand, the incentive for sub-central tax authorities to collaborate by sharing relevant tax 
information has also been accounted for in the literature that has focused on the incentives for tax 
cooperation between countries to reduce evasion in an international mobile-capital framework (see Keen & 
Ligthart, 2006a, for a survey). In particular, the seminal study by Bacchetta & Espinosa (1995) identifies the 
strategic trade-off between competitive behaviour – lowering the tax rate to increase foreign investment – 
and cooperative behaviour – voluntarily sharing information to reduce international tax evasion. In 
equilibrium, the second effect may dominate the former resulting in partial information exchange. In a more 
recent study, Bacchetta & Espinosa (2000) further their previous analysis by modelling the choice of tax 
rates and information provision as an infinitely repeated game. A contribution in this same line is provided 
by Huizinga & Nielsen (2002) who model a repeated game in which tax authorities choose between 
withholding taxes and sharing information as alternatives for dealing with international capital income and 
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profit taxation6. Both studies argue that potential cooperation in information sharing is a matter of reciprocity 
and, in particular, that it may be sustained if the process is viewed as an infinitely repeated game rather than 
as a single one. In this regard, the propensity of a country to cooperate directly depends on the potential 
cooperative behaviour of the other country in previous periods. Thus, in these models each country evaluates 
the trade-off between not providing information and obtaining a corresponding temporary gain (due to their 
attracting tax evading investors) versus suffering the costs of the non-cooperative behaviour of the other 
country (generally, more aggressive tax competition or the absence of information exchange or both) forever 
after.  
 
Our empirical framework reflects existing theoretical models – given the existence of a trade-off between 
cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour – but applied to a federal context. The main differences between 
the two contexts lie in the tax authorities’ motivation and incentive to cooperate. In an international 
framework with mobile capital, countries share fiscal information with the aim of avoiding, or of at least 
reducing, a race to the bottom in tax rates and the resulting negative effects on tax revenues. This kind of 
cooperation between countries reduces tax fraud.  
 
Some empirical papers have tested these models in an international framework. In particular, Ligthart and 
Voget (2010) study the determinants of tax information sharing between Dutch and foreign tax authorities 
for income tax purposes. From our perspective, the most interesting result in this paper concerns reciprocity. 
The authors show that an increase in the amount of tax information provided by the Dutch tax authorities to 
their foreign counterparts significantly increases the amount of information received by the Dutch tax 
authorities. Elsayyad (2012) analyses recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the 
outcome of a bargaining process over treaty form and focuses on the presence of an exchange of information 
clause. The paper shows that the likelihood of treaty-signing is mainly driven by a tax haven’s bargaining 
power and good governance. Moreover, the author finds that it is easier for an OECD country to renegotiate 
an already existing treaty so as to incorporate an information exchange clause than to pressure countries to 
do so without an existing agreement. By interpreting the existence of a previous agreement between two 
                                                            
6 These contributions generated further research (e.g. Tanzi & Zee, 2001; Chisik & Davies, 2004, Keen & Ligthart, 
2006b). 
5
countries as a measure of reciprocity, we have further confirmation that reciprocity matters in determining 
the level of information exchanged between two tax authorities. 
 
In our federal framework, sub-central tax authorities should automatically cooperate in order to rectify any 
errors that might arise in the reporting of tax returns, but they have an incentive not to cooperate that is 
driven by the presence of administrative costs and the loss of financial revenue yields. In this context and 
according to our hypothesis, reciprocity not only reinforces the tax information exchange process, but it is 
the essential driving force promoting cooperation as it encourages tax authorities to switch from short- to far-
sighted behaviour. This empirical analysis of a federal framework represents, we believe, a novelty and 
progress in the literature.  
 
3. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we present the dataset and define the empirical methodology employed in developing our 
analysis. 
 
3.1 The empirical framework 
Data on Spain’s regional tax administrations are extracted from the report “Informe sobre la cesión de 
tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas” published every year jointly with the project of the general State 
budget. Specifically, we have access to data on the total number and total amount of transfers resulting from 
misreported tax returns (“Transferencias por aplicación de los puntos de conexión”) collected (returned) by 
each CA from (to) any other region during the 1989-2009 period7. Hence, in contrast with previous analyses, 
our dataset allows us to identify both directions in the information-sharing process. Additionally, the 
availability of a time span allows us to adopt a dynamic approach and, thus, to test for the possibility that 
regional administrations learn the potential advantages of gradually sharing information.  
 
                                                            
7 For instance, in 2000 the region of Andalusia transferred 828,192 euros to the region of Castile-La Mancha, 
corresponding to seven cases of misreported taxes. And the latter, for example, transferred 15,872.9 euros to the region 
of Valencia, corresponding to 33 cases.  
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Our endogenous variable is the amount of tax revenues transferred by each CA to every other CA in a given 
year and thus takes the form of a continuous random variable over strictly positive values, but it assumes the 
value zero with positive probability. Our dataset contains 43.02 percent zero-valued output. Thus, our 
endogenous variable may be censored at zero inasmuch as a zero value could alternatively indicate an actual 
absence of misreported taxes or that CAs choose not to share information on misreported taxes and claim to 
have zero tax revenues to transmit. Therefore, we maintain the random-effects Tobit corner-solution model 
as our main approach (see Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 518-549)8, which is defined as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛼𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝜷 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝁 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡]                                                      (1)  
 
where 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the amount of misreported tax revenues transmitted by region i to region j during 
year t. We control for reciprocity through the misreported tax revenues received by region i from region j 
during the previous year, 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1. This is the key regressor, since our main hypothesis is that 
reciprocity fosters cooperation between regional tax authorities and then we expect 𝛼 to be positive.  
 
We introduce a series of control variables that account for both region pair-specific characteristics and 
unilateral determinants referring to region i that might influence the information-sharing process. The pair-
specific variables are collected in vector 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕. In particular, 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the number of cases of misreported taxes 
transmitted from region i to region j in year t. According to Ligthart and Voget (2010), the distance between 
regions might reduce the flow of information between them. We therefore control for 𝐷𝑖𝑗, the physical 
distance in kilometres between i and j. The political alignment between Spanish regions9 is another variable 
that might have an impact on the tax administrations’ willingness to cooperate. Thus, we introduce 𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡, a 
dummy identifying the political alignment between the two regions at time t. The relative GDP of the two 
regions at time t, 𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡, is also included in order to account for the relative economic power of the two 
                                                            
8 In a previous version of this paper we employed the number of cases of misreported taxes transmitted as our 
endogenous variable. Given that this is a count-data variable we used an estimation strategy based on Poisson 
regression models obtaining results that are congruent with those obtained through the current estimation strategy. 
These results are available upon request. 
 
9 Note this factor is specific for an analysis within a federal context. 
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regions, that is, as a measure of the relative bargaining position of region i with respect to region j (Elsayyad, 
2012). A positive (negative) sign would indicate a favourable (unfavourable) bargaining position of region i 
with respect to region j due to a higher (lower) amount of revenues transmitted by region i to region j.  
 
The vector 𝑿𝒊𝒕 includes a constant term and the unilateral variables. According to the previous literature on 
the exchange of tax information (Bacchetta & Espinosa, 1995, 2000), the statutory tax parameters and the 
enforcement costs are crucial in determining the level of information exchange between tax authorities. 
These issues are also relevant in our context, albeit in a different way; thus, we control for 
𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝑇𝑎𝑥_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 𝑇𝑜𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑔_𝐴𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 that account for total tax revenues and total 
tax auditing revenues collected by region i during year t, respectively. These variables are proxies of regional 
tax autonomy in raising revenues and they are expected to be associated with greater amounts of information 
being exchanged. Budgetary and political variables might also play a role in determining tax administration 
policies (see, e.g. Esteller-Moré 2005, 2011). In particular, we control for the deficit expected at the 
beginning of every fiscal period in order to account for the financial conditions of regional budgets and to 
measure indirectly the financial opportunity cost of cooperation of region i. We expect a higher deficit to 
negatively impact the transmission of misreported revenues. We return to this variable below. We include the 
total amount of transfers received from the central government divided by total regional expenditure to 
account for a further budgetary factor relevant in a federal framework, such as that operated in Spain. We 
expect this variable to have an income effect on the behaviour of the tax administrations. In particular, a 
higher transfer-expenditure ratio should force the administration to rely less on its own tax resources and to 
transfer more tax revenues to the other regions. We are not able to identify the impact of the administrative 
costs of cooperation, but reasonably suppose it to be constant over time. As such it will be picked up by the 
constant term; however, if it varies over time (and uniformly throughout the ACs) it will be picked up by the 
time effects. In the case of the political variables, we include a dummy equal to one, 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑡, if there is a 
regional election in region 𝑖 during the year 𝑡, to control for the potential impact of the electoral cycle on the 
incentives to share information. To account for modifications to the statutory tax parameters, we include a 
dummy, 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, equal to one if the regional government 𝑖 introduces a deduction in (at least) one tax during 
8
the year10. 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable equal to one if the party in office in a specific region and year is to the 
left of the political spectrum. 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 is the total population and accounts for regional size. We finally include 
a set of time dummies 𝜏𝑡, while 𝜗𝑖𝑗 is an unobserved pair-specific disturbance that is constant over time and 
𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is an idiosyncratic error that varies across time and pair of regions
11. The parameters of Eq. (1) are 
estimated by maximum likelihood.  
 
In order to have a better understanding of the determinants of the tax information sharing process, we extend 
this model in a dynamic fashion allowing for sluggish adjustment in the endogenous variable. It might take 
time for the regional tax authorities to process all the misreported tax revenues, and so inertia might play a 
role in this process. Thus, following Wooldridge (2002, pp. 542-543), we also estimate a dynamic Tobit 
model with unobserved effects: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝛿𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋 + 𝑿𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗
+ 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                                                                                                    (2) 
 
As in Eq. (1), we expect reciprocity to positively impact the cooperative behaviour of the regional tax 
authorities, and then expect 𝛿 to be positive. In addition, we test the persistency hypothesis. In this regard, 
the function 𝑔(. ) allows 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 to appear in a variety of ways. We employ two alternative 
specifications: 
 
(i) 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 ; and 
(ii)  𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = {1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = 0]; 1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 }, 
where 1[. ] is the indicator function. 
                                                            
10 In our framework – in contrast with the hypothesis proposed by Bachetta and Espinosa (1995) – it is unlikely that a 
CA behaves strategically and lowers the tax burden via tax rate cuts, so as to induce, to a certain measure, taxpayers to 
err in their tax returns: taxpayers would pay less and the CA would collect more tax revenues. All the same, in our case 
it is difficult to identify such behaviour since the information on the misreported tax revenues transmitted is available at 
an aggregated level and not tax by tax. 
 
11 In particular, 𝜗𝑖𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜗) and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀). 
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 The first approach is the standard dynamic model and in this case we expect 𝛾 to be positive, that is, 
cooperative behaviour in the previous period is expected to foster present cooperation. The second approach 
allows the effect of the lagged endogenous variable to be different depending on whether the previous 
response was a corner solution (zero) or strictly positive; then, in this case, 𝛾 is a vector 2×1 (see Wooldridge 
2002, pp. 542-543). Specifically in this case we expect to find a persistent behaviour over time so that zero-
valued transmitted misreported revenue in t – 1 is expected to negatively impact the cooperative behaviour 
while the component 1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 is expected to be positively related to the 
propensity to cooperate at time t.   
 
In dynamic Tobit models with unobserved effects, the treatment of the initial observations is a key issue12. 
Wooldridge (2005) proposes a fairly general and tractable solution to this econometric issue. This approach 
consists in specifying a distribution for the unobserved effect, 𝑐𝑖𝑗, given the initial value, 𝑇𝑅𝑖0, and the 
exogenous variables in all time periods. This leads to a fairly straightforward procedure that is no different 
from the standard static random-effects Tobit model. For practical purposes, the only difference between the 
exogenous initial values assumption and Wooldridge’s approach is that the latter includes the initial values of 
the endogenous variable as additional explanatory variables in the regression13. 
 
In our framework, the main incentives for a CA not to cooperate are the administrative costs as well as the 
financial costs of losing the financial yield of undue tax revenues. Thus, we suspect that a CA with relatively 
short-term budget constraints will decide to reduce cooperation. In order to identify the role of 
financial/budget constraints in influencing reciprocity we interact 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with 1[𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡], a dummy 
                                                            
12 The ideal case would be that the observed panel dataset starts together with the stochastic process. In this case the 
initial values are known constants. If data are not collected at the beginning of the process, assuming that the initial 
values are exogenous might lead to bias and inconsistency in the estimators (Heckman, 1981; Hyslop, 1999; Honore, 
2002). The first period in our dataset is 1989 but the decentralization of the relevant taxes began in the mid-eighties, 
thus there are a few years for which these data are missing. Although the assumption of exogenous initial values might 
not be too strong because the missing years are relatively few in comparison to the extent of the dataset, the most 
appropriate approach is to assume that the initial values are endogenous. For a formal discussion of this issue see e.g. 
Akay (2009). 
 
13 For a formal discussion of these issues and a formal derivation of this model, see Wooldridge (2002, pp. 542-543; 
2005). 
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equal to one if region i expects a deficit in period t. We perform this interaction for both the static and the 
dynamic models. Then, Eq. (2) is modified as follows: 
 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡 = max[0, 𝛾𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + 𝛿1𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿2𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 × 1[𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡] + 𝒀𝒊𝒋𝒕𝝋
+ 𝑿′𝒊𝒕𝝆 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖𝑗 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡] .                                                                                                           (3) 
 
Eq. (1) is also modified in a similar fashion. We expect 𝛿2 to be negative. 
  
3.2 Data and sources 
The data on the cases of misreported taxes and their corresponding revenues, in addition to the regional tax 
and audit revenues and the dummy 𝐷𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡, are extracted from the report entitled “Informe sobre la cesión de 
tributos a las Comunidades Autónomas”. The other variables are obtained from the following statistical 
sources. The distance between two CAs is the Euclidean distance between their capitals and is calculated 
using their geographical coordinates and is expressed in kilometres. The political alignment is defined using 
the information on the political colour of the governments in office, which we also employ for the definition 
of the variable 𝐿𝑒𝑓𝑡𝑖𝑡. This information is obtained from Zarate’s Political Collections website 
(http://zarate.eu/spain2.htm). The relative GDP is based on data from the Spanish National Institute of 
Statistics (INE). The transfers-expenditure ratio is constructed as the ratio between the total amount of 
transfers received from the central government (extracted from the INE database) and the total regional 
expenditure (extracted from the Ministry of Economy and Finance database). The deficit is that expected at 
the beginning of the fiscal year and is extracted from the database of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. 
The information on election years is obtained from the Ministry of the Interior’s website 
(http://goo.gl/YCS3J). In Table 1, we report the summary statistics. 
 
[TABLE 1] 
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4. Results 
In Table 2, we present the results of the estimation of Eq. (1), that is, the static model. We report a GLS 
random-effects specification in column (1), a standard Tobit model in column (2), and column (3) reports the 
random-effects Tobit model, which is our preferred estimation strategy. The amount of misreported tax 
revenues transmitted by CA i to CA j positively depends on reciprocity, which is proxied by the time-lagged 
tax revenues received by CA i from CA j. This result is robust to the different specifications. According to 
the random effects Tobit model reported in column (3), a one euro increase in the tax revenues received by 
CA i from CA j in year t-1 results in an increase of 0.385 euros of tax revenues being transmitted from CA i 
to CA j in year t, holding all other variables constant. Clearly, the amount of misreported revenues increases 
as the number of cases of transmitted misreported taxes grows. Specifically, according to model (3), one 
additional case of misreported taxes leads to an increase in transmitted revenues of almost 6.5 thousand 
euros, keeping constant all the other variables. The estimate of the distance between regions is significant 
and robust to the two different Tobit specifications presenting negative coefficients: two distant regions share 
less misreported revenues than is the case between two closer CAs. This corroborates previous results in the 
literature. Furthermore, we find that the deficit negatively impacts the cooperative behaviour of the tax 
administration. Those CAs with a higher expected deficit at the beginning of the year are less willing to 
transfer misreported tax revenues. As for the control variables, we find that regional size, proxied by 
population, is positively associated with the transfer of misreported tax revenues. None of the remaining 
covariates is found to be significant, but they are jointly statistically significant according to a Wald test. 
 
[TABLE 2] 
 
In Table 3, we present the results of the estimation of the alternative specifications of Eq. (2). In columns (1) 
and (2) we set 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1, while in columns (3) and (4) we assume 
𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) = {1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 = 0]; 1[𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 > 0] × 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 }. The 
dynamic Tobit models in columns (2) and (4) are estimated by employing Wooldridge’s (2005) approach, 
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while the models in columns (1) and (3) are estimated by assuming exogenous initial values. The results 
suggest that there is a sluggish adjustment in the process of transmission of misreported tax revenues. In 
models (1) and (2) the coefficients of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 suggest that a one euro increase in misreported tax 
revenues transmitted by CA i to CA j in the previous year leads to an increase of almost 0.235 euros in the 
transmitted misreported revenues in the current year. Moreover, the results obtained by means of the 
estimation of models (3) and (4) corroborate our hypothesis of congruency in the behaviour of the regional 
tax authorities. The CAs that did not transmit revenues in t – 1 tend to transmit less revenues in t, while the 
CAs that had transmitted revenues in t – 1 transfer on average 0.023 euros more in t for any additional euro 
transmitted in t–1. The initial value of the transmitted misreported revenues does not turn out to be 
significant, suggesting that there is no correlation between the unobserved heterogeneity and the initial 
condition. This is probably due to the fact that the first period in our panel dataset coincides mostly with the 
true starting point generating the process. Although Wooldridge’s method is the most appropriate for the 
estimation of this process, this result indicates that the bias in the estimation of 𝑔(𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) under 
the exogenous initial values assumption is not severe as confirmed by the magnitudes of the coefficients 
obtained through the two methodologies that are almost equal. Taking inertia into account, though, does not 
modify the main results obtained when estimating Eq. (1). In particular, reciprocity remains a driving force 
of the process.  
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
In Table 4 we report the results of the estimation when we interact 𝑅𝑒𝑐_𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑡−1 with a dummy identifying 
periods of expected budget in deficit (Eq. 3). Both in the static and in the dynamic approach, we still find 
reciprocity to be positively associated with the revenue transmission process, but this relationship is weaker 
during the periods in which CA i faces relatively more binding budget constraints. In the absence of deficit, 
the CAs transmit according to the different specifications at around 0.80 – 0.84 of every 1 euro received, 
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while in the presence of (an expected) deficit they transmit less than half that amount, 0.29 – 0.35 of every 1 
euro received. 
 
[TABLE 4] 
5. Conclusions  
We have analysed an area of horizontal tax interdependence that may occur in federal contexts, namely, the 
transmission of misreported tax revenues between sub-central tax administrations. We have obtained some 
evidence of the determinants of cooperation between the Spanish regional tax authorities. Our analysis, 
based on a Tobit estimation strategy, suggests that cooperation is a matter of reciprocity and so we 
corroborate the results of the relevant theoretical literature. More specifically, the amount of tax revenues 
transmitted from one region to another positively depends on the revenues received from the latter in the 
previous period. This is the main result of the paper and it is significant and robust to different specifications. 
Furthermore, we have found that the reciprocity link existing between two CAs becomes weaker when 
budget constraints are binding, i.e. in the presence of an expected deficit. In addition, the estimation of a 
dynamic Tobit model suggests that there is a sluggish adjustment in the setting of this process.  
 
Therefore, once tax administrations engage in cooperative behaviour, it is maintained, fostering even closer 
cooperation between them. This is a crucial point because it suggests that once regional tax administrations 
become aware of the potential benefits of cooperation, they do not deviate from this equilibrium. In this 
regard, we can conclude that the correct functioning of the decentralized tax administration in Spain is 
hindered by the existence of administrative, financial and transaction costs and, as such, cooperation is 
reached only in the medium-long run. This is, in part at least, good news for the functioning of a 
decentralized tax administration. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
Variable Measurement unit Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Transmitted Tax Revenues thousands of 2001 euro 4,203 144.87 1,179.61 0 37,111.18 
Received Tax Revenues thousands of 2001 euro 4,206 114.30 954.11 0 38,900.90 
Cases of Transmitted 
misreported taxes number of cases 4,410 22.53 196.28 0 10,533 
Cases of Received 
misreported taxes number of cases 4,410 36.13 505.42 0 22,944 
Distance kilometres 4,410 630.73 512.75 31 2204 
Political Alignment Dummy 4,410 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Relative GDP Ratio 4,410 1.04 0.29 0.46 2.15 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues millions of 2001 euros 4,410 72.51 104.64 1.73 775.02 
Tot_Reg_Audit_Revenues millions of 2001 euros 3,990 3.59 6.69 0 49.85 
Deficit thousands of 2001 euro  4,200 -68,860.48 27,1390.3 -24,78177 1,270,978 
1[Deficit] dummy 4,200 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Transfers/Expenditure 
share of expenditure 
financed by transfers 4,410 0.35 0.17 -0.04 1.37 
Leftist Government dummy 4,410 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Election Year dummy 4,410 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Deduction dummy 4,410 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Population thousands of people 4,410 2,542.28 2,168.17 261.34 8,150.47 
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Table 2: Determinants of the information sharing process. TOBIT-RE and alternative specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator GLS-RE TOBIT TOBIT-RE 
    
L.Received Tax Revenues 0.467*** 0.438*** 0.385*** 
 (10.456) (7.351) (6.311) 
Cases of Transmitted misreported taxes 5.891*** 6.892*** 6.478*** 
 (23.516) (20.554) (17.874) 
Distance -0.017 -0.288*** -0.299*** 
 (-0.562) (-5.850) (-4.603) 
Political Alignment -64.845** -61.081 -45.212 
 (-2.094) (-1.293) (-0.880) 
Relative GDP -36.360 -4.180 14.190 
 (-0.587) (-0.043) (0.113) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 11.970 1.062 8.352 
 (0.717) (0.042) (0.295) 
Tot_Reg_Audit_Revenues -0.648 -1.219 -1.158 
 (-0.777) (-1.008) (-0.908) 
Deficit  -0.000* -0.000** -0.000* 
 (-1.848) (-2.052) (-1.768) 
Transfers/Expenditure 161.385 396.833 366.767 
 (1.037) (1.580) (1.400) 
Election Year -2.153 -73.051 -74.340 
 (-0.061) (-1.340) (-1.212) 
Deduction -8.960 9.324 0.885 
 (-0.162) (0.116) (0.011) 
Leftist Government -12.665 -113.368 -89.040 
 (-0.180) (-1.126) (-0.846) 
Population 0.006 0.065*** 0.069*** 
 (0.765) (5.545) (4.401) 
_cons 48.804 -184.113 -220.779 
 (0.346) (-0.851) (-0.915) 
Observations 3,446 3,446 3,446 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,504 1,504 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
R2 0.244 - - 
Log likelihood - -17,134.759 -17,112.908 
Wald chi2 1100.793 1036.608 785.558 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and 
p-values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
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Table 3: Determinants of the information sharing process  
Dynamic TOBIT-RE: alternative specifications 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
 Exogenous 
initial values 
Wooldridge 
method 
Exogenous 
initial values 
Wooldridge 
method 
     
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues 0.234*** 0.235*** - - 
 (9.438) (9.456)   
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -712.641*** -712.263*** 
   (-13.257) (-13.168) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - - 0.023*** 0.023*** 
   (9.394) (9.393) 
L.Received Tax Revenues  0.327*** 0.327*** 0.378*** 0.378*** 
 (5.440) (5.442) (6.393) (6.393) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.791 - 0.058 
  (1.512)  (0.063) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 5.926*** 5.930*** 5.848*** 5.848*** 
 (16.620) (16.634) (17.365) (17.364) 
Distance -0.283*** -0.271*** -0.188*** -0.187*** 
 (-4.718) (-4.482) (-3.745) (-3.709) 
Political Alignment -33.301 -32.097 -66.883 -66.807 
 (-0.664) (-0.640) (-1.403) (-1.401) 
Relative GDP 10.889 17.485 -27.411 -27.191 
 (0.093) (0.149) (-0.280) (-0.278) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 18.989 18.371 15.238 15.199 
 (0.665) (0.644) (0.576) (0.574) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -1.600 -1.470 -1.248 -1.242 
 (-1.280) (-1.174) (-1.032) (-1.024) 
Deficit -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.485) (-1.459) (-1.502) (-1.500) 
Transfers/Expenditure 446.910* 434.541* 376.867 376.357 
 (1.700) (1.652) (1.463) (1.461) 
Election Year -49.016 -51.271 -40.768 -40.883 
 (-0.824) (-0.862) (-0.739) (-0.741) 
Deduction -2.659 -3.200 -13.971 -13.994 
 (-0.033) (-0.040) (-0.172) (-0.173) 
Leftist Government -96.980 -98.314 -77.896 -77.954 
 (-0.944) (-0.957) (-0.777) (-0.778) 
Population 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 
 (4.468) (4.175) (3.193) (3.147) 
_cons -340.952 -351.172 -96.233 -96.555 
 (-1.442) (-1.485) (-0.434) (-0.436) 
Observations 3,405 3,405 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,490 1,490.000 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -16,845.972 -16,844.828 -16,769.765 -16,769.763 
Wald chi2 923.174 927.285 1,276.899 1,276.878 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and 
p-values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
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Table 4: Determinants of the information sharing process. Interactions with High Deficit. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Estimator TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE TOBIT-RE 
  Wooldridge 
method 
Wooldridge 
method 
    
L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - 0.238*** - 
  (9.585)  
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues = 0] - - -704.264*** 
   (-13.022) 
1[L.Transmitted Tax Revenues> 0]×L.Transmitted Tax Revenues - - 0.023*** 
   (9.482) 
L.Received Tax Revenues 0.798*** 0.816*** 0.836*** 
 (3.939) (4.113) (4.312) 
L.Received Tax Revenues×1[Deficit] -0.442** -0.525** -0.495** 
 (-2.125) (-2.570) (-2.474) 
Transmitted Tax Revenuest=1989 - 1.600 -0.090 
  (1.372) (-0.098) 
Cases of Misreported Taxes 6.492*** 5.933*** 5.829*** 
 (17.969) (16.726) (17.329) 
Distance -0.296*** -0.268*** -0.185*** 
 (-4.602) (-4.497) (-3.675) 
Political Alignment -47.302 -34.418 -67.460 
 (-0.923) (-0.689) (-1.417) 
Relative GDP 25.821 30.349 -15.383 
 (0.207) (0.263) (-0.157) 
Tot_Reg_Tax_Revenues 4.904 14.925 12.763 
 (0.173) (0.525) (0.482) 
Tot_IGT_Audit_Revenues -1.257 -1.607 -1.376 
 (-0.988) (-1.287) (-1.134) 
1[Deficit] 74.688 77.504 54.397 
 (1.176) (1.239) (0.862) 
Deficit -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
 (-1.764) (-1.448) (-1.294) 
Transfer/Expenditure 301.820 371.018 333.402 
 (1.134) (1.393) (1.275) 
Left -73.329 -50.600 -41.794 
 (-1.197) (-0.854) (-0.756) 
Election 3.812 0.536 -10.327 
 (0.047) (0.007) (-0.128) 
Deduction -70.078 -78.229 -62.124 
 (-0.662) (-0.758) (-0.614) 
Population 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 
 (4.400) (4.200) (3.158) 
_cons -256.972 -392.334* -133.715 
 (-1.065) (-1.660) (-0.600) 
Linear Combinations    
L.Received Tax Revenues +L.Received Tax Revenues× 1[Deficit] 0.355*** 0.291*** 0.341*** 
 (5.65) (4.69) (5.59) 
Observations 3,446 3,405 3,405 
Censored Observations 1,504 1,490 1,490 
Number of groups (couple of regions) 210 210 210 
Log likelihood -17,110.207 -16,841.078 -16,766.540 
Wald chi2 796.081 944.918 1,285.733 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For all specifications, we report χ2 statistics and 
p-values for the Wald test of joint significance. Time effects and regional dummies are included in all specifications.  
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